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FABRIZIO BIGLINO 
The Silent Revolution: 
The Roman Army between Polybius and Marius 
Traditionally, Polybius’ description of the Roman army in Book VI of his Histories is con-
sidered the de facto image of the mid-Republican Roman legions until the major changes 
introduced by the reforms attributed to Gaius Marius. However, there are several elements 
highlighting the fact that Polybius’ description actually depicts a rather outdated military 
system, making it hard to accept it as an up-to-date portrait of the army by the mid-second 
century. By examining hints within the sources, this paper aims to proper examine the 
major variations that interested the Roman military system from the mid-third to the late 
second centuries and to highlight their overall impact.1 
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The Roman army was a very complex organization that had, in its ability 
to change and adapt to the necessities of war, one of its most striking 
characteristics and, arguably, one of the keys to its success.2 From the ear-
liest days when, as described by Keppie, it was little more than an armed 
band of few hundred men raiding neighbouring territories, the exercitus, 
throughout the long Republican period, experienced several radical trans-
formations until 31. Then, following his victory at Actium, Octavian es-
tablished a new standing army of professional soldiers, closing one phase 
of the Roman army’s history and starting an entirely new one.3 
                                                 
1 All the dates are BC unless indicated otherwise; all translations are from Perseus Dig-
ital Library with the exception of Valerius Maximus, Memorable doings and sayings, 
trans. by D. R. SHACKLETON-BAILEY, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U.P., 2000. 
2 Diod. Sic. 23.2: “…the Romans, so they asserted, were pupils who always outstripped 
their masters.”; also see Plb. 6, 25 and BRAND (2019: 108-109). 
3 KEPPIE (1984: 14); on Augustus’ reform of the Roman army, see Suet. Aug. 24. 
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This paper aims to examine a series of significant changes experi-
enced by the Roman army during the period comprised between the mid-
third and the late second centuries, emphasizing their long-term impact. 
These progressive transformations proved to be so important that they 
influenced the well-known Marian reforms as such contributing to struc-
tural changes in the late Republican army. However, despite such impli-
cations, these changes are presented in a very disjointed fashion in the 
sources and are not even as prominent as other well-known and attested 
episodes such as the manipular system or the already mentioned Marian 
reforms.4 This overall lack of attention by the sources might be caused by 
the fact that their impact was considered limited only to the military and 
they did not seem to bring revolutionary transformations that affected 
Roman society as well. The manipular legions, after all, required a differ-
ent recruitment system from the hoplite army inherited by the monarchy; 
thus, Roman society was re-organized in order to facilitate the levying of 
these new units. Marius, on the other hand, is credited with opening the 
legions to all citizens, including the capite censi, the poorest elements in 
Roman society excluded from military service up until that moment.  
By looking at the evidence as a whole, this paper will show that, 
though slow, this was a progressive and organic transformation of the 
army dictated by the necessities of war, necessities that were different 
from those experienced by the Republic during its previous wars. From 
the mid-third century, after all, Rome started to wage war outside of pen-
insular Italy, and the development of a more complex military structure 
was thus inevitable.5 
Between Polybius and Marius 
Of great importance for this paper is Polybius’ description of the Roman 
army in Book VI of his Histories, which is generally considered the de facto 
image of the mid-Republican military and the main reference regarding its 
structure and other key mechanisms – such as recruitment procedures, 
                                                 
4 The manipular legion is mentioned in Liv. 8, 6–8, but more as a state of affairs by the 
mid fourth century. 
5 Plb. 1, 12 on Appius Claudius Caudex’s forces landing in Sicily in 264: “That was the 
first time an armed force of Romans left Italy by sea…” 
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payment, etc. – until the major changes introduced by the reforms attribut-
ed to Gaius Marius from 107.6 Polybius’ description, however, suffers from 
one major issue: its chronology. While it is generally accepted that Polybius 
wrote during the mid-second century, he actually depicts a rather outdated 
military system, making it hard to accept it as an up to-date portrait of the 
Roman army.7 Polybius, like other Greek military writers, offers a textbook 
description which does not take into account intermittent or real-life varia-
tions. The Roman army, between the mid-third and the late second centu-
ries, experienced several important variations. Throughout this paper, I 
will emphasize these changes by bringing together the evidence scattered 
in different sources and, ultimately, suggesting that the army, by the mid-
second century, was quite different from the one described by Polybius 
and actually closer to the one attributed to Marius. 
The traditional structure and evolution of the Republican army can be 
summarised as follows: by the time of the siege of Veii (406-396), the hop-
lite phase, inherited from the monarchy, had reached its peak, although 
this has been debated by recent scholarship.8 The next development in-
volved the introduction of the manipular system, which required the 
adoption of new equipment and recruitment practices.9 Though trying to 
date with confidence this conversion is quite challenging, it is possible to 
                                                 
6 Regarding the date of the reforms, both Sall. Jug. 86 and Plu. Mar. 9 place them right 
after he won his first consulship; Gell. 16, 10, 14 offers an alternative by suggesting that 
the reform of the recruitment system might have happened during the Cimbric War 
(maybe in 104, following the defeat at Arausio, so during Marius’ second consulship), 
but then adds: “…or more probably, as Sallust says, in the Jugurthine War, to have 
enrolled soldiers from the capite censi, since such an act was unheard of before that 
time.” 
7 RAWSON (1971: 13–15); also see BRUNT (1971: 627–628). 
8 RAWSON (1971: 13): “Literature and archaeology agree to make us believe that at some 
time in the archaic period the phalanx style of hoplite warfare was introduced to 
Rome, possibly from Etruria…”; also see GOLDSWORTHY (2003: 21–23) and RICH (2007: 
17–18); on Rome not adopting hoplite warfare see ROSENSTEIN (2010), ARMSTRONG 
(2016: 111–112). 
9 Liv. 8, 8: “The Romans had formerly used round shields; then, after they began to serve 
for pay, they changed from round to oblong shields; and their previous formation in 
phalanxes, like the Macedonian army, became a battle line formed by maniples…” this 
passage is placed about 340, at the time of the Latin War. Also see KEPPIE (1984: 19). 
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suggest that it was a progressive transformation that took place between 
the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Diodorus suggests that the Ro-
mans were militarily influenced by their contacts with the Samnites.10 
Therefore, it might be possible to suggest the years between 390 – the Gal-
lic raid – and 354 – first official contact between Romans and Samnites – 
as the transformation period, with the First Samnite War (343–341) as the 
potential terminus ante quem.11 After all, Livy states that by the time of 
the Latin War (340–338) both Romans and Latins employed maniples as 
their tactical units, so they had to be relatively familiar with them.12 The 
next major change highlighted by the sources are the reforms attributed 
to Gaius Marius who, in particular, is credited with having opened mili-
tary service to all Roman citizens. This is considered a true revolution by 
the literary sources since, up until that moment, service in the army was 
based on the census rating of the individual citizens.13 The so-called Mar-
ian reforms are believed to represent a major step toward the profession-
alization of military service, a process later completed by Octavian’s mili-
tary reforms and the creation of the Imperial army.14 
Where does Polybius’ description fit in this summary? As said, it is 
considered the main source on the Roman army during the mid-
Republic before the changes of the late Republican period, but, at the 
same time, it suffers from a chronological issue. Therefore, suggesting a 
more plausible date for Polybius’ account allows us to better understand 
the chronology of the crucial changes that the Roman army experienced 
during the mid-Republican period. Keppie argues that Polybius is de-
scribing the Roman army at the end of the Second Punic War, thus sug-
                                                 
10 D.S. 23, 2. 
11 D.S. 16, 45, 7 and Liv. 7, 19 on the treaty of 354 between Romans and Samnites. 
12 Liv. 8, 8: “They knew that not only must section meet section in battle, the whole line 
of hastati face hastai, principes face principes…” 
13 Plu. Mar. 9: “…he immediately began to rise an army. Contrary to law and custom 
he enrolled large number of paupers…”; Sall. Jug. 86: “Meanwhile he himself enlisted 
soldiers, not in the traditional way from the propertied classes, but accepting whoever 
volunteered, generally from the headcount.”; Val. Max. 2, 3: “This old tradition had 
been in force for a long time and was well established by then, but Marius abolished it 
by enlisting men without property as soldiers.” 
14 See KEPPIE (1984: 146–147) and GOLDSWORTHY (2003: 50). 
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gesting that it maintained this structure, organization and strength until 
the Marian reforms.15 Michael Dobson, on the other hand, suggests that 
the dating should be moved to the beginning of the Hannibalic War.16 
Neither suggestion is satisfactory, however, as they both clash with the 
evidence on the matter of the number of legions that composed the 
overall army. As Dobson himself remarks, it is clear that the four-legion 
system was definitely anachronistic by the mid-second century.17 It is 
my suggestion, however, that there is evidence in the sources that this 
number was already outdated by the Second Punic War. 
First of all, Livy states that in 218, at the beginning of the war, the 
Romans levied six legions and the number of legions recruited through-
out the war would greatly increase from that.18 Even by the end of the 
war, and for years after, the number of legions would not return to the 
supposed “standard” of four.19 Second, Polybius himself offers contra-
dictions to his own model. In the well-known description of Rome’s 
manpower during the Gallic invasion of 225, he suggests that the Ro-
man army fielded ten legions for a total of 52 300 citizens under arms, a 
considerably larger force than a traditional four legions army.20 Next, 
the chronicle of the early years of the First Punic War might offers addi-
tional references to the abandonment of the four-legion system. In 264, 
consul Appius Claudius was sent to Sicily with a standard consular ar-
                                                 
15 KEPPIE (1984: 33): “It is reasonable to take into account as reflecting the organization 
of the Roman army as it emerged from the struggle against Hannibal.” 
16 DOBSON (2006: 55): “Consequently it can be suggested that the organisation of the 
Roman army described by Polybius in Book Six is essentially an account of the struc-
ture that the army had reached at the beginning of the Second Punic War.” 
17 DOBSON (2006: 55): “The discrepancy of his source from his own period is also re-
flected by the description of the army and its encampment being essentially of a dou-
ble-consular army of four legions with allies. Such an army seems to have ceased being 
the typical form of the Roman army during the Second Punic War.” 
18 See Liv. 21, 17 on the legions in service in 218. 
19 Liv. 30, 41 reports that in 201 there still fourteen legions in service; the following year 
(200) the number of legions decreased to six (see Liv. 31, 8), but it increased to eight in 
198 (see Liv. 32, 8). 
20 Plb. 2, 24 reports 22 000 Romans in consular armies (thus four legions of 5 500 men), 
8 800 Romans (two legions of 4 400 men each) were deployed in Sicily and Tarentum, 
while 21 500 more stayed in Rome as a reserve (roughly four more legions). 
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my to support the Mamertines at Messana.21 The following year (263), 
both new consuls, Marcus Valerius Maximus and Manius Otacilius 
Crassus, were assigned to Sicily, each at the head of a consular army.22 
Zonaras says that Claudius had left a garrison, so it would seem that in 
263 the Romans had more than the traditional four legions in Sicily, thus 
showing that this conflict can be suggested as the start of the abandon-
ment of the traditional manipular army described by Polybius.23 
Therefore, I believe that Polybius is actually describing the final and 
most refined version of the manipular system and the army described in 
Book VI can be dated to the mid-third century.24 Also, the First Punic War 
can be suggested as the starting point of the progressive transformation of 
the army that would be completed not by Marius, as is usually implied, 
but by Sulla. With a more plausible chronology of Polybius’ description, it 
is then possible to emphasize the main elements of the Roman army that 
no longer apply by the mid-second century and how they had changed. 
Next, I will highlight five major elements in which the Roman army 
of the mid-second century differed from Polybius’ description and why 
they are important. Such elements allow to better contextualize the Ro-
man army, understand its progressive transformation and appreciate 
how they paved the way to the armies of the late Republic. It is im-
portant to emphasize that most of these changes were not planned, but 
were dictated by the necessities of war – which had influenced most of 
the previous changes as well. 
1. Number of legions 
The number of legions is the main problem with Polybius’ description. I 
believe it is hard to argue against the fact that by the mid-second century 
the four-legion army was clearly anachronistic. Dobson states that it was 
abandoned during the Second Punic War, though, as remarked earlier in 
                                                 
21 Plb. 1, 11. 
22 See Plb. 1, 16 and D.S. 23, 4. 
23 Zonar. 9, 4–5; Plb. 1, 17 adds that, following the successes of 263, the Romans re-
duced their forces in Sicily to two legions. 
24 RICH (2007: 18): “By the end of the fourth century the Roman army must have 
reached much of the form in which it was described for us by Polybius, a century and a 
half later.” 
 The Silent Revolution 71 
the paper, it is possible to argue that episodes during the third century 
suggest an even earlier abandonment of this practice.25 Furthermore, by 
looking at the sources, there should be no doubt that Rome, following its 
victory over Carthage, did not return to the previous military structure 
in terms of the number of legions annually recruited. 
Livy’s chronicle shows that the Republic, during the first half of the 
second century, often recruited eight legions, double the number sug-
gested by Polybius, divided between the four consular ones, two for the 
Spanish provinces and two more deployed were needed. This number, 
after all, is mentioned by Livy at least on fourteen occasions between 200 
and 167. By no means, however, should this be considered a new stand-
ard number of legions, because Rome did not have an official standard 
number of legions prescribed by law.26 It is possible to highlight the un-
predictability of Rome’s recruitment by examining Livy’s chronicle of the 
beginning of the century. By 201, the final year of the Second Punic War, 
there were still fourteen legions in service deployed between Cisalpine 
Gaul, various parts of Italy, Sardinia, Sicily and Spain.27 In 200, this 
number was reduced to six until 198, when it was increased to eight, 
brought back to six in 197 and increased to ten in 195.28 
The rest of the second century follows a similar pattern, due to the 
unpredictability of the necessities of war. There are, in fact, plenty of 
occasions when the number of legions either increased or decreased 
quite significantly. The loss of Livy’s chronicle, of course, makes it hard-
er to state definite numbers. However, without going into too much de-
tail, it is still possible to suggest a general pattern for the rest of the sec-
ond century. Between 167 and 150 there was a relatively low number of 
legions in service, followed by a strong increase between 149 and 146 
(due to the Third Punic War). The number of legions remained relative-
ly high until 133, which coincide with the destruction of Numantia and 
                                                 
25 DOBSON (2008: 103): “Such an army seems to have ceased being the typical form of 
the Roman army during the Second Punic War.” 
26 NICOLET (1980: 98). 
27 Liv. 30, 1. 
28 On the legions in service see Liv. 31, 8 (200), 32, 1 (199), 32, 8 (198), 32, 28 (197), 33, 25 
(196), 33, 43 (195). 
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the end of the Spanish Wars, and kept decreasing until 113. The final 
decade of the second century, on the other end, is characterized by a 
higher number of legions in service due to the intense military activity 
experienced by the Republic: the campaign against the Scordisci in the 
Balkans, the Jugurthine War in Africa and, of course, the Cimbric War. 
The unpredictability of second century warfare, and the consequent 
fluctuating number of legions, can also be linked with the fact that Rome 
did not experience a difference between peace time and war time, at 
least not how that is understood today.29 The Republic was always at 
peace and always at war at the same time, and the second century very 
well encapsulates this state of affairs: for the most part, peninsular Italy, 
the core of Roman territory, was at peace during the second century. 
The invasion of the Cimbri between 102 and 101 was the first time since 
the Second Punic War that an invading army had entered Italy. Central 
Italy, on the other hand, would not experience fighting until the begin-
ning of the Social War in 91. The overseas provinces, on the other hand, 
often required troops, whose strength varied from garrisons to entire 
armies, but this also changed depending on the situation. Spain, of 
course, is the most emblematic example of this. Normally, Rome sta-
tioned two legions, one per province, as garrison; however, due to the 
endemic warfare of the second half of the second century, more and 
more legions were needed for the pacification of these provinces. Infor-
mation on the deployment of legions during this time comes primarily 
from Appian’s chronicle of the Spanish wars that, though vague at 
times, still offers an idea of the military efforts employed by Rome. 
There was more than one legion in Hispania Citerior from 143 to 133 
and from 142 to 136 in Hispania Ulterior; potentially, up to five legions 
were deployed respectively between 136 and 133 (Citerior) and between 
142 and 136 (Ulterior). Therefore, the year 136 is, perhaps, the most ex-
emplary of this situation: the entire Roman army, that year, was made 
up by fourteen legions, ten of which were stationed in Spain (the other 
four were divided between Northern Italy, Macedonia and Sicily). 
Therefore, by looking at the information in the sources, it becomes 
difficult to accept that, by the mid-second century, the Roman army was 
                                                 
29 NICOLET (1980: 97). 
 The Silent Revolution 73 
still made up by the four legions system described by Polybius. After all, 
this de-regulated recruitment, together with the fact that multiple le-
gions could be assigned to individual commanders, as it will be exam-
ined later, without a doubt facilitated the formation of the large armies 
of the first century. The Roman army would return to the concept of a 
standard number of legions only with Octavian’s military reforms 
which arranged for a standing army of twenty-eight legions (reduced to 
twenty-five after Teutoburg). 
2. Number of men per legion 
This element is extremely important in order to properly understand the 
demographic impact of military service. It is well-known that Polybius 
states that a standard Roman legion was made up by 4 500 citizens 
(4 200 infantry and 300 cavalry) and was supported by an allied contin-
gent (ala sociorum) of 5 100 men (4 200 infantry and 900 cavalry).30 There-
fore, in total, the Roman army described by Polybius, made up by four 
legions and as many alae sociorum, had the strength of 38 400 men (di-
vided between 18 000 Roman citizens and 20 400 socii). 
However, as said, Polybius is offering a textbook description of the 
Roman army and, consequently, ideal numbers. In reality, of course, the 
number of men per legions was extremely variable for various reasons. 
As remarked by Goldsworthy: “No army in history has managed to 
maintain all its units at their exact theoretical strength at all times. This 
is especially true on campaign, when units’ strengths are continually 
eroded…”31 and this reality became even more true from the mid-third 
century, once Rome started to become involved in large campaigns 
away from peninsular Italy. Also, there are different suggestions on the 
legions’ ideal strength throughout the various literary sources. Livy, for 
example, stops using Polybius’ figures in his chronicle by the late 180s; 
from that moment it seems that the number of Roman citizens in each 
legion was increased to 5 500 men.32 At the same time, however, he does 
not mention the socii, so it is uncertain that they were affected by such a 
                                                 
30 Plb. 6, 20; Gell. 16, 4 on the alae. 
31 GOLDSWORTHY (1996: 12). 
32 Liv. 40, 36. 
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change as well. Finally, there is Appian (primarily due to his chronicle 
of the Third Punic War and the Spanish Wars), who, frequently 
throughout his various histories, employs the number 6 000 with re-
gards to the strength of the legions. This, however, is rather problematic. 
It is important to remember that Appian was writing during the second 
century AD and it appears that he did not understand how the Republi-
can army was organized, especially regarding the role of the allies. 
Though there are a couple of exceptions, he is extremely vague on the 
composition of the Roman army.33As a consequence, the numbers of 
men reported in his chronicle are never easy to read, and the same is 
true of the casualties. For the most part, Appian simply says Ῥωμαῖοι 
(Romans), so it is not sure whether he is talking about Roman citizens 
only, or also the socii or even auxiliaries.34 
Most likely, the number of men per legion from the mid-third centu-
ry onwards, was dictated by the necessities of war and because of this, 
was extremely variable. I believe that the Second Punic War best repre-
sents this pattern. The following graph shows the variations of Roman 
citizens in the legions estimated by Brunt from 216 (before Cannae, 
“216*”, and after Cannae, “216**”, in the graph) to 200: 
 
                                                 
33 The socii are mentioned only twice throughout the chronicle of the Spanish Wars: 
App. Hisp. 11, 65 and 67. 
34 Spaniards were recruited by the Romans: see App. Hisp. 10, 58 and 11, 63; also see 
DYSON (1985: 196). 
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Brunt suggests that legions in service before Cannae were 5 000 men 
strong, but that same year, after the battle, the number of citizens in ser-
vice decreased to 4 100 per legion.35 This negative trend continued for 
the rest of the war until it reached the lowest point by 206 when, accord-
ing to Brunt, the twenty legions in service counted on average only 2 750 
Roman citizens, a massive drop from the standard Polybian number 
(4 500 per legion). From this point, the number of Roman soldiers in the 
legions slowly started to increase again (2 900 citizens per legion in 204), 
but never reached their supposed standard number for the rest of the 
war. However, Brunt estimates that in 200, right after the war, the 
standard manpower of each legion was increased to 5 500 men. The de-
mographic implications of such a model are extremely relevant in inves-
tigating the impact of recruitment during the war, or, more in general, of 
Roman warfare. For example, by looking at the year 211, Rome had a 
massive army of twenty-five legions in service across the Mediterrane-
an; in Polybian numbers, that would total as 112 500 citizens.36 If, on the 
other hand, each legion actually counted 3 000 men, as suggested by 
Brunt, the overall strength of the army would decrease to 75 000 citi-
zens, a significant difference when considering the impact of recruit-
ment during this period of the war. Though very interesting, Brunt’s 
model can be questioned by examining the sources. It is plausible that in 
216, for example, with the exception of the stronger legions deployed at 
Cannae, the rest of the army consisted of normal legions of 4 500 men. 
At the same time, however, the three legions on the Spanish front were 
probably slightly weaker.37 Also, in 210, while Brunt estimates that each 
                                                 
35 See BRUNT (1971: 418). 
36 Liv. 26, 1 offers the detail on the legions in service in 211, but has several omissions; 
it seems that there weren’t many changes from the previous year, as most of the text is 
focused on extensions of commands, thus the total of twenty-five legions from 212 was 
maintained for 211 as well. 
37 Liv. 21, 17 says that Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio’ army that landed in Spain was com-
posed by two legions of 8 600 Romans and 15 600 allies. Liv. 22, 22 mentions that in 217 
the senate, encouraged by Scipio’s successes, sent 30 warships and 8 000 men to Spain. 
However, it is not clear how many of these were Romans and how many allies. Proba-
bly this force consisted of one legion plus socii under the command of Publius Scipio 
who joined his brother Gnaeus. 
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legion counted 3 100 citizens, Livy mentions legions that, after discharg-
ing veterans, had 5 300 Romans and 7 300 allies.38 It appears, then, that 
there is no clear answer on this matter. Nevertheless, considering a 
combination of casualties, the defection of important allied communi-
ties, and the fact that Rome prioritized some fronts over others, it is 
plausible to suggest weaker legions. 
Overall, there is no way to know how the actual strength of the le-
gions varied not only during the Hannibalic War but throughout the 
second century as well. It is possible that consular legions, as they were 
the most important and deployed on the main fronts, were kept at 
standard strength, while others, especially those assigned to less im-
portant fronts or to garrison duty, might have less men or not receive 
reinforcements for longer periods of time. 
3. Cohorts instead of maniples 
As the hoplite formation was progressively abandoned between the late 
fifth and early fourth centuries, the Roman army of the Republican peri-
od, from a tactical point of view, was dominated by its successor, the 
maniples, until they were replaced in turn by the cohorts. While it is 
traditionally believed that this new formation was introduced by Gaius 
Marius, various sources suggest that cohorts were actually introduced 
before the Marian reforms, as early as the Second Punic War.39 Alt-
hough, at first, the passage from maniples to cohorts might be consid-
ered secondary, as limited exclusively to the army and its tactics, it also 
carried deep socio-economic consequences. 
Technically, Livy uses the term cohort from his second book in an 
episode dated to 508, though this is clearly anachronistic.40 The earliest 
reliable reference to a cohort in his chronicle is in 210.41 Most famously, 
however, Scipio Africanus is supposed to have employed cohorts dur-
ing his Spanish campaign. As remarked by Polybius: “Scipio with the 
three leading squadrons of cavalry from the right wing, preceded by the 
                                                 
38 Liv. 26, 28. 
39 On cohorts being introduced by Marius see MATTHEWS (2010: 29–37). 
40 Liv. 2, 11. 
41 Liv. 25, 39. 
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usual number of velites and three maniples (a combination of troops 
which the Romans call a cohort), he advanced straight on the ene-
my…”42 Because of this, Scipio is sometimes considered the commander 
responsible for introducing the cohort within the Roman army, though 
such a reading is slightly simplistic. It is more likely that Scipio em-
ployed battle formations and tactical variations that can be considered 
the basis for the cohorts. Such variations, due to their success and the 
necessities of war, became more and more common in the Roman army 
during the second century until they completely replaced the maniples 
by the final part of the century.43 Furthermore, it is possible to interpret 
the previously discussed increase in the legions’ manpower mentioned 
by Livy as suggesting the use of cohorts already by the late 180s, since 
they required more men then maniples.44 Most likely, the Romans 
adapted their legions according to the requirements of each individual 
campaign and the individual enemy. During this period, these varied 
from the large, well-organized armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms to 
guerrilla warfare in Spain. Such a scenario is also supported by archaeo-
logical evidence. The army camps at Numantia offer indications for the 
coexistence of both maniples and cohorts, but also that the latter, pro-
gressively, replaced the former from the mid-second century.45 This co-
existence is further supported by Sallust who, in his account of the Ju-
gurthine War (112–105), states that Roman soldiers were trained to 
change formation from maniples to cohorts when necessary.46 For such 
manoeuvres to be possible, cohorts must already have been in regular 
use, further indication that they predated Marius. 
Finally, Polybius’ comment on cohorts during the Second Punic War 
should be considered as additional evidence for the outdatedness of the 
army’s description in Book VI. After all, he shows awareness of cohorts 
being the tactical units of the Roman army, or, at least, that at the time 
                                                 
42 Plb. 11, 23; also see Liv. 28, 13 on cohorts being deployed in Spain in 206. 
43 See DOBSON (2006: 100) and KEPPIE (1984: 44) on the coexistence of maniples and 
cohorts. 
44 Livy 40, 36; also see BELL (1965: 409). 
45 See KEPPIE (1984: 63) and DOBSON (2006: 100). 
46 Sall. Jug. 51, 3. 
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both they and the maniples were being employed.47 Despite this, his de-
scription only covers the old manipular army at a time when cohorts 
were, most likely, the army’s main tactical units. This is reinforced by 
the last mention of maniples being used in the field coming in Sallust’s 
Jugurthine War, only a few decades after Polybius was writing.48 
As mentioned, cohorts not only implied larger legions or different 
tactics, but their earlier introduction and their progressive replacement 
of maniples also carried significant socio-economic implications. There 
are, in fact, two important factors to be considered: the progressive re-
duction of the property requirement for military service and the remov-
al of the velites. As is well known, maniples were formed by different 
troop types (velites, hastati, principes, and triarii) with different equip-
ment. Cohorts, on the other hand, did not have light infantry and were 
primarily formed by poorer soldiers who shared the same equipment, 
thus implying a stronger standardization.49 Consequently, the produc-
tion and distribution of military and non-military equipment on such a 
scale would have been possible only through state involvement.50 These 
two factors are clearly connected with each other. Keppie, for example, 
argues that the reduction of the minimum census instigated the passage 
from maniples to cohorts, suggesting that the latter happened by the 
time of Marius.51 As mentioned by the sources, the minimum census 
requirement for military service was reduced to 1 500 asses by the late 
                                                 
47 See Plb. 11, 23. 
48 Sall. Jug. 50, 1; 100, 2 and 103, 1 mentions light-armoured soldiers, probably velites; 
also, Jug. 50, 4 says: “…they were being wounded only from a distance and given no 
chance of striking back or engaging in hand-to-hand combat.” so he is talking about 
Roman troops without long-range weapons, probably the triarii (as velites, hastati and 
principes were all armed with pila). 
49 See DOBSON (2006: 103). 
50 MATTHEW (2010: 34): “The merging of the maniples into cohorts removed the velites 
from the formation, and subsequently removed a large proportion of the legion’s mis-
sile capabilities. To counter this loss, all legionaries were uniformly armed with sword 
(gladius), large shield (scutum) and javelins (pila). The removal of the spear as the prin-
cipal offensive weapon of the triarii indicates that the uniform equipping and depend-
ence on the gladius and scutum was an alteration made to suit close-contact fighting 
that would occur when engaged.” 
51 KEPPIE (1984: 44). 
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second century, allowing poorer citizens to join the legions, before being 
abandoned altogether by Marius.52 Keppie’s logic, however, can also be 
applied to the earlier change to 4 000 asses reported by Polybius, thus 
suggesting an earlier introduction of cohorts.53After all, this is already a 
rather low minimum census requirement, roughly the equivalent of 4 
iugera of property, and would have allowed the enlistment of poorer 
citizens who were unable to afford their equipment which now had to 
be standardized and (perhaps) provided by the state.54 Then, by the 
120s, when the property requirement was reduced to the aforemen-
tioned 1 500 asses, this issue became even more common. This, I believe, 
is well-portrayed by our main epigraphic evidence for the Republican 
army: the altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus. Dated at least to 122, it shows 
a level of standardization of equipment well before Marius. 
It is in fact reasonable to suggest that the Second Punic War provid-
ed a strong impetus for the standardization of military equipment and 
the subsequent state involvement in its production and distribution. 
This has been criticized by Daly who, more traditionally, suggests that 
the Marian reforms were responsible for triggering this process.55 His 
argument, however, is mainly based on considering Polybius’ descrip-
tion of the army as up-to-date in the mid-second century, which clearly 
it was not. The Hannibalic War, after all, caused a first major reduction 
of the census requirement for service (arguably more impactful than the 
                                                 
52 Cic. Rep. 2, 40; Gell. 16, 10, 10; Non. 228 L; on the census’ reduction see GABBA (1973: 
6–7); on Marius ignoring the minimum census, see BRUNT (1971: 406): “There is no 
other evidence […] that Marius had to pass a law to authorize his procedure. He simp-
ly exerted his imperium to enlist men whom it had not been the normal practice to 
enlist…” also see DOBSON (2006: 103) and RICH (1983: 323–330). 
53 Plb. 6, 19. 
54 See RATHBONE (2008: 308): “Because actual property values must have varied consid-
erably, the Romans presumably had some notional scale of landholding in mind which 
corresponded to the cash figures, and minima of 100, 75, 50 and 25 iugera for the first 
four classes seem plausible to me, which would imply a notional 4 iugera for the fifth 
classis.” Although ROSENSTEIN (2002: 190) argues: “No source informs us of the mini-
mum number of iugera that a citizen would have had to have owned during the mid-
dle Republic in order to qualify as an assiduus. Quite probably no fixed figure exist-
ed…” 
55 DALY (2002: 211–212). 
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second) which, combined with the massive military demands of the con-
flicts, brought important changes to the Roman army’s structure and 
organization that continued throughout the second century. 
4. Ratio between citizens and allies 
The traditional approach to this topic is that the allies were always more 
numerous than the Romans, a characteristic quite common among first 
century sources. Velleius famously emphasizes this issue, saying that by 
the time of the Social War: “The fortune of the Italians was as cruel as 
their cause was just; for they were seeking citizenship in the state whose 
power they were defending by their arms; every year and in every war 
they were furnishing a double number of men, both of cavalry and of 
infantry, and yet were not admitted to the rights of citizens…”56 Other 
authors, such as Dionysius or Livy, seem to support this and suggest 
that this issue was already common by the early third century.57 
Polybius, on the other hand, offers a different trend: each year the 
socii contributed to the army by sending their own forces which totalled 
the same number of infantrymen as the Romans, but three times as 
many cavalrymen. Overall, a legion was formed by 4 500 Roman citi-
zens and supported by 5 100 allies, thus suggesting a 1:1.1 ratio instead 
of the 1:2 mentioned by other sources. Polybius’ ratio is rather con-
sistent: in his description of the mass recruitment in response to the Gal-
lic invasion of 225 (although this is controversial), he states that the con-
sular armies were formed by a total of 22 000 Romans and 32 000 socii, 
showing a 1:1.4 ratio. In both cases, while the allies still contributed to 
the Roman military effort more men than the Romans themselves, the 
difference is not as dramatic as portrayed by Velleius or Dionysius. 
                                                 
56 Vell. 2, 15. 
57 Liv. 10, 26 on the battle of Sentinum (295): “The force with which the consuls had 
taken the field consisted of four legions and a large body of cavalry […], whilst the 
contingents furnished by the allies and the Latin League formed an even larger army 
than the Roman army.”; also see D.H. 20, 1 on the battle of Asculum (279): “…on the 
Roman side there were more than 70 000, about 20 000 of them being from Rome it-
self.”; on the battle of Asculum also see Frontin. Strat. 2, 3, 21, but he does not make 
any distinction between Romans and allies. 
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Investigating the number of soldiers in service on a yearly basis is 
the only way to have a better idea on the actual ratio between Romans 
and allies during the period under investigation. After all, I believe that 
the literature claiming the allies always outnumbered the Romans was 
strongly influenced by pro-Italian propaganda from the time of the So-
cial War. In reality, the ratio between citizens and socii in the army of the 
Republic was not as standardized as traditionally believed. The second 
century shows that it was actually rather variable, and changed often 
due to the necessities of war as well as political and tactical factors. 
By examining yearly recruitment rates, at the same time, it is possi-
ble to suggest a trend that influenced the ratio between citizens and al-
lies during the second century: at first, the number of allied troops actu-
ally increased. This was possibly caused by a sort of retaliation against 
those communities who defected during the Second Punic War follow-
ing the events of 216. In 190, for example, Livy offers a detailed account 
of troops recruited and where these new soldiers were moved and sta-
tioned. In total, 25 600 Roman citizens and 46 800 socii were enlisted that 
year, thus suggesting a ratio of 1:1.8 in favour of the allies.58 
Next, following the increase of Roman troops in the legions in the 
late 180s suggested by Livy, the ratio actually started to move towards 
parity. As mentioned in the previous section, this manpower increase 
might have been triggered by the potential earlier introduction of co-
horts. Livy does not mention whether this affected the socii as well, 
though it is plausible. The levy of 178/177, for example, shows that a 
total of 27 500 citizens and 30 450 allies were recruited that year, with a 
                                                 
58 Liv. 37, 2: the consular army in Macedonia (formed by two legions) was reinforced 
by 3 100 Romans and 5 200 allies. The other consul received two new legions (9 000 
citizens) supported by 15 600 socii. Two city legions (9 000 Romans) and 15 600 allies 
were moved to Apulia-Bruttium while a new legion (4 500 citizens) and 10 400 socii 
was stationed in Etruria. Livy also mentions that the army in Sicily was reinforced by 
local recruitment of 2 100 men while the navy also received additional 1 000 marines 
and 2 000 soldiers. In both these cases, however, Livy does not mention the proveni-
ence of the recruits. Considering that provincial and naval recruitment during this 
period interested the allies for the most part, it is possible that most of these 5 100 extra 
soldiers were not Roman citizens. We cannot be sure and, in any case, this would not 
much change the overall ratio. 
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ratio of 1:1.1 still in favour of the socii, but with a rather marginal differ-
ence.59 Livy’s chronicle also shows that Roman soldiers, at times, actual-
ly outnumbered the allies. During the levy of 170/169, the first consul 
received the two Macedonian legions (which were stronger than usual: 
6 300 Romans each with the same number of socii, so 12 600 citizens and 
12 600 allies), the second consul two standard legions (11 000 citizens) 
supported by 10 600 allied troops, with the rest of the army consisting of 
four legions (22 000 Romans) and 17 000 socii.60 Therefore, on this occa-
sion, it is possible to see a ratio of 1.1:1 in favour of the Roman citizens. 
With the end of Livy’s chronicle, investigating the number of sol-
diers recruited during the second half of the second century becomes 
more challenging. As an example, it is possible to examine an episode in 
Appian’s chronicle of the Spanish War, more specifically, the army 
raised by Fabius Maximus Aemilianus in 145 sent to Hispania Ulterior 
to fight the Lusitanians. Appian mentions that Aemilianus decided to 
recruit young men instead of the veterans of the Greek and African 
campaigns and asked for additional forces from the allies – one of the 
very rare instances in which Appian actually mentions them. By the 
time Fabius arrived in Spain, he had two legions for a total of 17 000 
men under his command.61 Unfortunately, while mentioning the allies, 
Appian does not provide any information on the composition of this 
force, so we can only speculate; as Aemilianus, according to Appian, 
asked the allies for ‘additional forces’, it is possible that the socii were 
slightly more numerous, though probably not by much. Of course, there 
was already an army in the province, though weakened by previous 
encounters with the Lusitanians, as Aemilianus was replacing Gaius 
Plautius, the previous unsuccessful commander. Appian simply men-
tions that he arrived in Spain with 11 300 men, but there is no mention 
on the composition of his force, so this may have further changed the 
                                                 
59 See Liv. 41, 9: both consuls received two legions of 5 500 Romans each plus 12 600 
allies, for a total of 22 000 Romans and 25 200 socii in the consular armies. Also, one 
more legion (5 500 Romans) supported by 5 250 socii was sent to Spain. 
60 Liv. 43, 12. 
61 App. Hisp. 11, 65. 
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already uncertain ratio of Aemilianus’ army.62 Finally, it is important to 
remember that the Romans also employed foreign auxiliaries during the 
Spanish Wars. Appian mentions the recruitment of other Spaniards un-
der the treaty signed after Gracchus’ campaign in 179, as well as rein-
forcements sent from Numidia.63 This shows how difficult calculating 
the ratio between Roman citizens and Italian allies would become by the 
mid-second century, further indication that simply assuming that the 
allies were always double would be a major generalization. 
Overall, the real issue regarding the ratio between Romans and socii 
is the fact that, despite their unquestionable military contribution and 
importance, the allies are not mentioned very often in the literary 
sources, making it hard to investigate their military participation more 
accurately. Polybius, while offering a more realistic ratio, still does not 
provide an accurate depiction of second century military service. Erd-
kamp has suggested that he did not make efforts to properly distinguish 
the Italians from the Romans since, to him, they were part of the same 
army.64 An example of this could be the description of the plundering of 
a city and the ensuing division of the booty among soldiers: “…when 
this booty has been sold, the tribunes distribute the proceeds among all 
equally…”65 From this, it appears that Roman and allied soldiers were 
treated in a rather equal fashion, thus clashing with Velleius’ overly 
dramatic depiction of the allies’ military condition by the time of the 
Social War. 
Therefore, I would argue that, during the second century and up to 
the Social War, the ratio between Romans and socii was not standard-
ized, but rather variable, as it was influenced by tactical and political 
factors. The constant double ratio suggested by later sources should be 
disregarded as an exaggeration caused by Italian grievances at the time 
of the Social War. More realistically, I believe it is plausible to suggest 
                                                 
62 On Plautius’ army see App. Hisp. 11, 64. 
63 App. Hisp. 8, 43 on Gracchus; on the treaties also see DYSON (1985: 196). On Numidi-
ans see App. Hisp. 11, 67, as part of Servilianus’ army (142), and Hisp. 14, 89 within 
Scipio’s army at Numantia (134). 
64 See ERDKAMP (2007: 55). 
65 Plb. 10, 16. 
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that the ratio was closer to parity, though, quite often, the socii were 
slightly more numerous. This reflects the fact that they were more nu-
merous than Roman citizens overall. 
5. Number of legions assigned to commanders 
The formula of two legions per consul described by Polybius is consid-
ered a staple of the Republican army.66 It would seem, however, that by 
the mid-second century, this “rule” was not applied anymore, or, at 
least, it was bent according to the necessities of war. The cause, once 
again, was that the army of the Republic was actually not very regulat-
ed, but was strongly influenced by the necessities of individual cam-
paigns. First, as said earlier, the Roman army did not have a legal limit 
to the number of legions it could field and the Punic Wars – the Second 
in particular – showed that the Republic could recruit as many as need-
ed according to the military situation. After all, Rome had the manpow-
er capabilities to field huge armies. Also, the Second Punic War showed 
that the Republic had the resources and infrastructure to sustain such an 
unprecedented military effort, though not flawlessly, as Rome often 
lacked funds (inopia aerarii) during the challenging years after Cannae.67 
At the same time, there was no regulation imposing a limit to the num-
ber of legions that could be assigned to an individual commander either. 
The formula of assigning legions to the consuls appears more as a tradi-
tion that dates back to the early Republic, when the army inherited from 
the monarchy was divided into two once Rome started to elect two con-
suls instead of having a king. The number of legions was progressively 
increased to four (the two per consul formula described by Polybius), 
                                                 
66 Plb. 619: “On the appointed day, when those liable to service arrive in Rome, and 
assemble on the Capitol, the junior tribunes divide themselves into four groups, as the 
popular assembly or the consuls determine, since the main and original division of 
their forces is into four legions.” 
67 Liv. 23, 5: “Are we to tell you we are lacking in cash, as if that is all we lack? Fortune 
has left us absolutely nothing that we can even supplement! Legions, cavalry, weap-
ons, standards, horses, men, cash, supplies…”; see Liv. 23, 31 on the double taxation 
imposed in 215; also see Liv. 24, 18: “The workings of government were as vigorous at 
home as they were in the field. Because of the insolvency of the treasury…” and then 
he describes some measures adopted by the censors to gather money in 214. 
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most likely during the mid-fourth century, and remained the staple for a 
century, until the Punic Wars.68 As argued earlier, the First Punic War 
marks the beginning of the silent revolution that would progressively, 
yet fundamentally, change the Roman army. 
It is possible to argue that the deployment of larger legions can be 
seen as an early occurrence of assigning larger armies to individual 
commanders. The army with which Scipio invaded Africa during the 
Second Punic War (205–204) can be seen as an early example. Livy ar-
gues that, after preparations were completed, each of his two legions 
counted 6 500 citizens to which a similar – if not greater – number of 
socii should be added – for a total of, at least, 26 000 men.69 This was a 
considerable larger force than a traditional Polybian consular army (two 
legions plus alae), which totalled 19 200 men. Appian, more conserva-
tively, suggests that Scipio’s army, in total, had 17 600 men, though, in 
true Appian style, does not mention any distinction between Romans 
and allies.70 The stronger legions deployed for the Third Macedonian 
War (171) should be emphasized as well. Livy reports that the two le-
gions sent to Macedonia were stronger than the rest of the army, with a 
total manpower of 29 400 men (divided between 12 600 Romans – 6 300 
per legion – and 16 800 socii).71 So, though reported as two standard con-
sular legions, in the field these were stronger armies than were normally 
assigned to individual commanders. Thus, larger armies were already 
accepted in Rome by the late third century. 
This pattern continued throughout the second century, to the point 
that there were commanders leading armies of five or even eight le-
gions. More interesting is the fact that this is barely mentioned in the 
literary evidence. Granted, sources on mid-second century military ac-
tivity are scarce, but it does not seem there was any outrage in Rome 
when a massive army of eight legions was sent to Africa against Car-
thage or by the fact that Scipio Aemilianus was besieging Numantia 
                                                 
68 Liv. 7, 23 mentions four legions already by 350. 
69 Liv. 29, 24–25. 
70 App. Pun. 3, 13. 
71 Liv. 42, 31 says that only the legions in Macedonia were stronger while all the others, 
including the other two consular legions, kept normal manpower levels. 
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with five legions.72 It is likely that during the levy, legions were still as-
signed to their commanders in the customary fashion, two per consul. 
The key difference, however, was made by important cases of accumula-
tion of troops. This became apparent during the Spanish campaigns, in 
particular the period between 141 and 133 in both provinces, and was 
repeated in other conflicts, such as the First Servile War in Sicily (135–
132) or the campaigns against the Scordisci in the Balkans (114–101). 
As said earlier, this might seem like a secondary issue, but it shows 
that commanders with very large armies were already accepted in Rome 
by the late third century and were becoming common by the mid-
second century. By not having any form of legal directive, and by set-
ting these precedents, the rise of the warlords and their large personal 
armies during the late Republican period became thus inevitable. Fur-
thermore, when combined with the progressive politicization of the sol-
diers and the actions of Sulla, the assignment of larger armies to indi-
vidual commanders is an element that surely had devastating conse-
quences for the Republic. 
Conclusions 
As argued at the beginning of this paper, the Roman army started to 
experience a progressive, yet fundamental structural and operational 
transformation from the mid-third century. These changes, although 
apparently more limited to the army itself, and thus not properly em-
phasized in the literary sources, or mentioned in a very confused fash-
ion, would actually have important socio-economic ramifications due to 
the army’s influence on the rest of the Republican structure. By bringing 
together these changes, however, it is possible to argue that, by the mid-
second century the Roman army was most likely closer to the one at-
tributed to Marius and retained little of what was described by Polybius. 
Therefore, the more traditional picture of the army of the mid-
Republican period (which, roughly, can be dated from the mid-fourth to 
the late second centuries) being structured and organized as described 
by Polybius until the reforms of Marius simply does not apply anymore. 
                                                 
72 App. Pun. 11, 75 says that Rome deployed an army of 84 000 men against Carthage; 
on Scipio’s army in Spain see App. Hisp. 15, 92. 
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Polybius, after all, is describing the Roman army on the eve of the 
Punic Wars, conflicts that had a massive impact on Rome at all levels, 
including – and especially – the military. The victory over Carthage 
triggered the Republic’s Mediterranean expansion for which the old 
manipular army simply was no longer enough. Naturally, because of 
the magnitude of the two Punic Wars and the new strategic needs of the 
Republic, the army had to change. Therefore, when Marius became con-
sul in 107, the army, for the most part, was already structured as it sup-
posedly was after his “reforms”, thus questioning the overall im-
portance attributed to those reforms. There is no doubt that his role has 
been greatly exaggerated by the literary sources, as he probably did not 
bring anything new to the army, but simply applied what was already 
common or, at best, simplified it. The recruitment of the capite censi is 
definitely the best example of this. Considering that, by this point, the 
minimum census for military service was so low that was basically irrel-
evant, Marius did what would have eventually happened regardless of 
his role: he ignored it. What is important is that he set the precedent. 
In between these moments, the army experienced a silent revolution 
that continued for the rest of the mid-Republican period until it reached 
its conclusion with Sulla and the aftermath of his action in 88. From this 
moment, the Roman army entered into a new phase of its history, the 
semi-professional forces of the late Republic, that would be concluded 
only with the end of the Civil Wars. Following Octavian’s military re-
form, a new, standing army of professional soldiers was formed, mark-
ing the beginning of a new phase of the history of the Roman army. 
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